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Proposition 36: Ignoring Amenability and Avoiding
Accountability
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1991 and the implementation of California’s first drug court,
the state has continued to expand on the idea of rehabilitation for drugoffenders.1 Over the past ten years California has produced some of the
nation’s most progressive drug laws.2 One of the most revolutionary
reforms was implemented by Proposition 36—a “treatment instead of
incarceration” initiative. This new attempt to rehabilitate minor drug
offenders appeared promising at first, but it soon became apparent that
the system was flawed. While the statutory language provided drug
offenders with needed opportunities to slip-up in their recoveries, it also
had language indicating that drug offenders needed to show they were
actually attempting to reform their lives. This clause for amenability has
since been all but ignored by the criminal justice system and has led to a
program that lacks accountability on the part of participants. It is no
wonder then that drug offenders are ultimately unmotivated by this
current law to complete drug treatment before it is too late and their
eligibility for such privileges is revoked. Until changes are made—either
to the language of the law or judicial implementation of the program—
Proposition 36 will continue to function at a sub-par level.
In November 2000, California voters passed an initiative to provide
offenders charged with minor drug crimes the option of participating in
drug treatment programs as part of probation, rather than going to
prison.3 The initiative, Proposition 36, was titled the “Substance Abuse
and Crime Prevention Act of 2000,”4 and passed by a decisive 61% of

1. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Drug Court Month Proclamation, May 1, 2004,
http://www.adp.ca.gov/DrugCourts/pdf/DrugCourtsProclamation.pdf (“Drug courts integrate
criminal justice, treatment services, educational opportunities and community partnerships in a
collaborative effort to tackle drug and alcohol dependence. Drug courts seek to break the devastating
cycle of addiction through judicial supervision, substance abuse treatment, and sanctions and
incentives.”).
2. Drug Policy Alliance, Reform in California, http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/
california/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
3. Prop36.org, About Prop 36, http://www.prop36.org/about.html (last visited Dec. 12,
2006).
4. California Campaign for New Drug Policies, Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse and
Crime Prevention Act, http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

531

532

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

California voters.5
Almost immediately California courts found themselves dealing with
how to interpret the statutory language of the new voter initiative—
examining such phrases as “washout period,”6 “amenability,”7 and “non
violent drug possession offenses.”8 The essence of Proposition 36
seemed clear enough in theory: help rehabilitate drug users and save the
taxpayers money. But in all practicality, the implementation and
interpretation of the Act left many Californians wondering if Proposition
36 really was the magic bullet voters had hoped it would be.
Part II of this comment addresses the history and purpose of
Proposition 36. It also summarizes what function the Act fulfills, its
incorporation into the California Penal Code and the Health and Safety
Code, and the changes the Act affected on probation of those convicted
of simple drug offenses.
Part III of this comment addresses the Act’s discussion of a
defendant’s amenability to Proposition 36 treatment. It delves more
specifically into the language of the Act and also discusses the California
appellate courts’ analysis of Proposition 36. It suggests that although the
statutory language of the Act is interpreted to apply to a broad range of
people, the requirements for finding a particular “drug-related” violation
are construed more strictly than might be imagined at first glance.
Conversely, once a defendant is placed on Proposition 36 probation, all
discussion of “amenability” appears to go out the window, and
California’s tough-love “3 strikes” approach to repeat offenders is all but
erased.
Part IV examines recently suggested amendments to Proposition 36,
specifically in the proposal embodied in Senate Bill 1137. It also
discusses state sentiment toward Proposition 36’s effectiveness and
highlights yearly UCLA reports evaluating the Act’s success in treating
drug offenders. Lastly, it looks at the potential implications this law and
related legislation may have on other states.
Part V concludes that the voter intent of Proposition 36, while
theoretically sound, is in fact construed broadly enough that the Act does
little more than stall the incarceration of minor9 drug offenders. Even the
appellate courts’ attempts to “knock sense” into violators by construing
“drug-related” offenses as narrowly as statutorily permissible does little

5. Prop36.org, supra note 3.
6. Moore v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 401, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
7. People v. Williams, 106 Cal. App. 4th 694, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
8. People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1207 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003).
9. The use of the word “minor” throughout this paper is meant in context of the type of drug
offense committed⎯not as a reference to the age of the offender.
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to actually help offenders turn their lives around. The result is that
despite multiple chances, many offenders are eventually taken off
probation and put in prison anyway.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Purpose of Proposition 36
In December 1972, the California legislature codified a program in
sections 1000–1000.4 of the California Penal Code that, in essence, gave
defendants convicted of certain drug offenses the opportunity to
rehabilitate rather than go to jail.10 This “diversion program” allowed
eligible defendants to avoid pleading guilty and instead be diverted and
referred for “education, treatment, or rehabilitation for a period from six
months to two years.”11 Once the defendant had satisfactorily completed
the program the original arrest was deemed not to have occurred.12
Eventually this program was replaced by deferred entry of judgment13
where the defendant, after being charged with certain enumerated drug
offenses, entered a guilty plea, participated in a drug rehabilitation
program, and would then have the charges dismissed upon successful
completion of the program.14 Although participation in the drug
10. People v. Ormiston, 105 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The court further
stated:
The purpose of such legislation . . . is two-fold. First, diversion permits the courts to
identify the experimental or tentative user before he becomes deeply involved with drugs,
to show him the error of his ways by prompt exposure to educational and counseling
programs in his own community, and to restore him to productive citizenship without the
lasting stigma of a criminal conviction. Second, reliance on this quick and inexpensive
method of disposition, when appropriate, reduces the clogging of the criminal justice
system by drug abuse prosecutions and thus enables the courts to devote their limited
time and resources to cases requiring full criminal processing.
Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 688 (quoting People v. Davis, 79 Cal. App 4th 251, 254 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).
Further, courts were authorized to divert defendants who were “formally charged with first-time
possession of drugs, have not yet gone to trial, and [were] found to be suitable for treatment and
rehabilitation at the local level.” Id. at 689.
12. Id. at 687 (citing Davis, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 254).
13. Id. (citing Stats. 1996, ch. 1132, § 2).
14. Id. The court further stated:
The provisions for deferred entry of judgment are available if a defendant satisfies the
requirements set forth in section 1000, subdivision (a)(1)–(6). The court then must
determine whether the defendant is suitable for participation pursuant to section 1000.2.
This requires the court to determine whether the defendant would be ‘benefited’ by the
deferred entry of judgment procedure. If found suitable, the defendant must waive the
right to a speedy trial, plead guilty and thereafter participate in a designated program for
at least 18 months, but no longer than three years. If the defendant fails to perform
satisfactorily, the prosecutor, the probation officer, or the court on its own motion may
seek entry of judgment.
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diversion program served to provide some minor offenders a chance to
treat their problem and keep their record free of criminal charges,15 there
was no legislation requiring courts to assign defendants to diversion
programs. The California legislature enacted the Substance Abuse and
Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA), or Proposition 36, on July 1,
2001,16 in response to this concern, intending that this piece of legislation
would expand the scheme of treating and rehabilitating first and second
time non-violent drug possession offenders.17
B. The Function of Proposition 36
The purpose of SACPA was to make communities safer by helping
drug offenders move toward recovery instead of steering them toward
overcrowded prisons and to lower taxpayer costs by aiding those
convicted of simple drug possession or drug use in getting treatment for
their addictions rather than wasting money incarcerating them.18 The
Id. (quoting Davis, 79 Cal. App 4th at 255–56 (citations omitted)).
15. Id. at 690–91; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.3, 1000.4(a) (West 2001).
16. Drug Policy Alliance, Prop 36: Effective and Popular with Voters, http://www.
drugpolicy.org/news/06_30_04prop36.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
17. Prop36.org supra note 3; see also California Campaign for New Drug Policies, Drug
Courts/Deferred Entry, http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/pdf/drugcourts.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2007) (“While this initiative does set up a new process for diversion, it is complementary to the
established Drug Courts and Deferred Entry programs.”); DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG
PROGRAMS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000 FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, May 21, 2001, http://www.adp.ca.gov/sacpa/pdf/P36_FAQ_Startup.pdf [hereinafter
SACPA, FAQ]. In response to the question of which defendants will be sent to Penal Code 1000
programs and which will be sent to treatment services under SACPA:
Specific criteria are provided in statute to define eligibility for SACPA and for Penal
Code 1000 (PC 1000), a separate diversion program. While the criteria are similar in
some respects, they are not identical. Whether a particular person qualifies for one or the
other depends on several factors. One key difference is that no judgment is entered prior
to entry into the PC 1000 system; entry of judgment is deferred until after it is determined
whether the participant successfully completes the program. Under SACPA, a judgment
of conviction is entered prior to receiving drug treatment services, and the charges and
conviction may be set aside after successful completion of treatment. Determination as to
which system a particular person is eligible for or utilizes will be made in the criminal
justice system.
Id. at 1.
18. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 36 § 3 “Purpose and Intent” (West) reads:
The People of the State of California hereby declare their purpose and intent in enacting
this act to be as follows:
To divert from incarceration into community-based substance abuse treatment programs
nonviolent defendants, probationers and parolees charged with simple drug possession or
drug use offense;
To halt the wasteful expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars each year on the
incarceration - - and reincarceration - - of nonviolent drug users who would be better
served by community-based treatment; and
To enhance public safety by reducing drug-related crime and preserving jails and prison
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authors of the Act declared that nonviolent drug offenders who received
treatment were less likely to abuse drugs and commit future crimes and
were more likely to lead productive, healthier lives.19 As a condition of
probation, Proposition 36 also required that recipients of probation
participate in and complete a drug treatment program.20 The court could
optionally order them to participate in vocational training, family
counseling, literacy training, or community service.21 The authors of the
Act tried, through Proposition 36, to follow the lead of similar legislation
in Arizona.22 The idea was that safety and health could be promoted and
taxpayer dollars could be saved23 with legislation that enhanced
probation for those persons who had a real possibility of being deterred
early from more serious criminal activities.

cells for serious and violent offenders, and to improve public health by reducing drug
abuse and drug dependence through proven and effective drug treatment strategies.
19. Id. § 2(a).
20. See id.; see also HIGHLIGHTS OF PROPOSITION 36 THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME
PREVENTION ACT, (Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/drugcourts/documents/
highlights.pdf (“Acceptable [drug treatment] programs include one or more of the following:
outpatient treatment, half-way house treatment, narcotic replacement therapy, drug education or
prevention courses, and/or limited inpatient or residential drug treatment.”).
21. Id.
22. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–901.01, Prop 200, § 3, “Purposes and Intent” (West 1956)
(Among the purposes of Proposition 200 were “to require that non-violent persons convicted of
personal possession or use of drugs successfully undergo court supervised mandatory drug treatment
programs and probation” and “to free up space in our prisons to provide room for violent offenders”)
vacated by State v. Gomez, 127 P.3d 873 (Ariz. 2006), available at http://www.druglibrary.
org/olsen/medical/azprop200.html; see also Robert L. Gottsfield, Prop 200: Arizona’s Answer to the
Nonviolent Drug Offender, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Oct. 2002, at 14, 14.
23. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 36 § 2 (West). Findings and Declarations (b)–(c) reads:
(b) Community safety and health are promoted, and taxpayer dollars are saved, when
nonviolent persons convicted of drug possession or drug use are provided appropriate
community-based treatment instead of incarceration
(c) In 1996, Arizona voters by a 2-1 margin passed the Drug Medicalization, Prevention,
and Control Act, which diverted nonviolent drug offenders into drug treatment and
education services rather than incarceration. According to a Report Card prepared by the
Arizona Supreme Court, the Arizona law: is “resulting in safer communities and more
substance abusing probationers in recovery,” has already saved the state taxpayers
millions of dollars, and is helping more than 75 percent of program participants to remain
drug free.
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C. Probation Under the New Act
After California voters approved Proposition 36, portions of it were
incorporated into the California Penal Code under sections 1210, 1210.1,
and 3063.1 and into the Health and Safety Code Division 10.8.24 These
new stipulations on probation effectively allowed minor drug offenders
more opportunities to violate their probation without having to suffer the
consequences of prison time.25 This emphasis on a probationary scheme
that advocated treatment and rehabilitation rather than resorting to
incarceration was a worthy idea and has, in fact, done good for many
drug offenders.26 However, without any real consequences for multiple
drug-related violations, Proposition 36 lacks the ability to hold drug
offenders accountable and leads to a large number of probationers who
never complete treatment.27
Though Proposition 36 may seem a more difficult type of probation
(more conditions and requirements) to endure, the multiple opportunities
for violation without noticeable consequences eases the offender into a
penal system of legal breaks and second and third chances, and as
Californians have discovered: where much is given, little is required (or
expected).
III. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND COURT INTERPRETATION
A. The Language Itself
The language of Proposition 36 indicated that the purpose of the Act
was to divert into treatment “those persons whose only offenses were
nonviolent drug possession offenses.”28 In fact, the language of
Proposition 36, which was adopted into the California Penal Code,
24. See § 1210 (from Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (Proposition 36)
Section 4); § 1210.1 (from Proposition 36 Section 5); § 3063.1 (from Proposition 36 Section 6);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE DIV. § 10.8 (West 2001) (from Proposition 36 Section 7).
25. Proposition 36 has been cited as a possible shift in public sentiment against a system that
has a tendency to incarcerate the innocent or impose excessive punishment through the three-strikes
approach to punishment. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three
Strikes’ Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 286 (2002) (reviewing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET
AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001)). In
fact, in 2001 there was a bill before the California Legislature (A.B. 1652) that “would build on
Proposition 36 as a way to limit the scope of Three Strikes. It would exempt simple drug possession
charges from third-strike status. The bill’s author, Jackie Goldberg, highlight[ed] the conflicting tone
of the two laws, and emphasize[d] the voters’ sentiment that substance abuse requires treatment, not
incarceration.” Id. (citations omitted).
26. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
27. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
28. People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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required that those convicted of nonviolent drug possession offenses
receive probation.29 Despite presenting clear and straightforward
definitions for the terms “nonviolent drug possession offense”30 and
“misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs,”31 the California courts
soon found themselves facing major statutory language issues, including
a need to define what constitutes a “drug-related condition” of probation
and how to properly determine an individual’s amenability to drug
treatment.
1. Drug-related conditions of probation keep drug-offenders on
Proposition 36
Violating a drug-related condition of probation essentially saves the
defendant from further punishment through incarceration.32 The language
of the Act (and its subsequent incorporation into Penal Code section
1201.1) states that once a defendant has been found eligible to participate
in Proposition 36,33 there is no easy way to revoke probation (and
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a) (West 2004).
30. § 1210(a) defines “non violent drug possession offense” as:
[T]he unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or transportation for personal
use of any controlled substance identified in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057 or
11058 of the Health and Safety Code, or the offense of being under the influence of a
controlled substance in violation of Section 11550 of the Health and Safety Code. The
term . . . does not include the possession for sale, production, or manufacturing of any
controlled substance and does not include violations of Section 4573.6 or 4573.8.
Id.
31. See, § 1210(d) (clarifying that the term refers to “a misdemeanor that does not involve (1)
the simple possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or
failure to register as a drug offender, or (2) any activity similar to those listed in [paragraph] (1)”).
32. A violation of a drug-related condition can include recent drug use, failure to appear at
treatment, failure to appear in court, noncompliance with treatment or failure to report for drug
testing. § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(B). Additionally, a defendant can also be found to have violated
probation by: [C]ommitting a nonviolent drug possession offense, or a misdemeanor for simple
possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or failure to
register as a drug offender, or any activity similar to those listed in subdivision (d) of Section 1210.
Id.
33. There are several provisions which disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36 eligibility.
Section 1210.1(b) reads:
Subdivision (a) shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) Any defendant who previously has been convicted of one or more violent or serious
felonies as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section
1192.7, respectively, unless the nonviolent drug possession offense occurred after a
period of five years in which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and the
commission of an offense that results in a felony conviction other than a nonviolent drug
possession offense, or a misdemeanor conviction involving physical injury or the threat
of physical injury to another person.
(2) Any defendant who, in addition to one or more nonviolent drug possession offenses,
has been convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of
drugs or any felony.
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potentially impose jail time) unless it is found that the defendant
“commit[ed] an offense that is not a nonviolent drug possession offense”
or that the defendant “violat[ed] a non-drug-related condition of
probation.”34 In such instances the court has the discretion to reinstate a
defendant on probation and allow them to continue participating in drug
treatment.35
When a defendant violates a drug-related condition of probation a
second time, the court must find that in addition to the violation, the
defendant is either a danger to others or is unamenable to drug
treatment.36 It is only when a defendant violates the terms of probation
three or more times that the court may conduct a hearing to possibly
revoke the defendant’s Proposition 36 eligibility. Even in such an
instance of multiple drug violations and reinstatements, the court may
still allow the defendant to continue on probation (and receive drug
treatment) if “the defendant is not a danger to the community and would
benefit from further treatment under subdivision (a)”37 of Penal Code
§ 1210.1.
2. Amenability as a way to enforce probationer accountability
Under the language of the Act, the only way to revoke a defendant’s
participation in Proposition 36 prior to a third or subsequent drug-related
violation is to find the defendant unamenable to treatment. Although the
word “amenability” is not specifically defined in the statute, a dictionary
understanding indicates that a defendant that is amenable is “obedient,
(3) Any defendant who, while armed with a deadly weapon, with the intent to use the
same as a deadly weapon, unlawfully possesses or is under the influence of any
controlled substance identified in Section 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058 of the
Health and Safety Code.
(4) Any defendant who refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation.
(5) Any defendant who has two separate convictions for nonviolent drug possession
offenses, has participated in two separate courses of drug treatment pursuant to
subdivision (a), and is found by the court, by clear and convincing evidence, to be
unamenable to any and all forms of available drug treatment, as defined in subdivision
(b) of Section 1210. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the trial court shall
sentence that defendant to 30 days in jail.
§1210.1(b).
34. § 1210.1(f)(2).
35. Conversely, if a defendant is found to have violated a non-violent drug-related condition
of probation, the court is allowed to revoke probation only if “the alleged probation violation is
proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant poses a danger to
the safety of others.” §1210.1(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Without a clear argument from the state
that the defendant poses a danger to the safety of others, he or she will be reinstated on Proposition
36. Id.
36. § 1210.1(f)(3)(B).
37. § 1210.1(f)(3)(C).
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tractable”38 and “responsible to authority.”39 While it may seem
inherently obvious that repeated drug-violations are indicators of a
defendant’s unamenability to drug treatment, the authors of the Act have
deemed it appropriate to add the further clarification that amenability
could be considered separate from probation violations. The California
Penal Code states that in determining whether a defendant is unamenable
to drug treatment, the court may consider, to the extent relevant, whether
the defendant (i) has committed a serious violation of rules at the drug
treatment program, (ii) has repeatedly committed violations of program
rules that inhibit the defendant’s ability to function in the program, or
(iii) has continually refused to participate in the program or asked to be
removed from the program.40
Thus, although the Act does state that an indicator of unamenability
is a defendant’s verbal refusal of treatment, the implication is that
amenability does not turn on a defendant’s words alone. In fact the
implication is that amenability (or lack thereof) is more apparent in a
drug offender’s actions (e.g. violating rules of the program, refusing to
participate, etc.) than in his explicit words (i.e. asking to be removed
from the program) alone.
Being amenable cannot even come into play for a court until at least
the second probation violation hearing.41 It is not until after a defendant
is in treatment subject to Proposition 36 and has already been through at
least one hearing process for drug violations (drugs being the very reason
the defendant was arrested and put on Proposition 36 in the first place)
that a court may then consider whether that defendant has repeatedly
violated rules or continually refused to participate in the program in a
manner that would indicate that the defendant is not amenable.42 The
question is, then, in a practical setting what disqualifies a defendant from
Proposition 36 treatment? While it is true that Penal Code § 1210.1 does
allow the probation department “to move to revoke a probationer who is
‘unamenable’ to treatment even though normally entitled to mandatory
probations,”43 that scenario does not often play out in the California court
system. Indeed, knowing that “it is true that nonviolent drug users don’t
often get the message until after the first, second or third rehab,”44 what
does it take for a court to find that a defendant is only using this new

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY REVISED EDITION 24 (1996).
Id.
§ 1210.1(f)(3)(B).
Id.
Id.
Gottsfield, supra note 22, at 19.
Id.
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rehabilitation program to continue his or her drug use as long as possible
without suffering consequences harsher than re-placement into the same
program?45
It should be noted that these defendants are eligible for Proposition
36 because they have committed minor drug offenses. Logically, if they
are going to violate the terms of their probation, the violation is most
likely going to be a drug-related one. The legislation accounts for this
through the amenability clause. The argument here is not that all drug
offenders are trying to “game” the system—but rather that without
analyzing amenability there is no way to distinguish between those
defendants who are struggling to go straight and those who are stalling
their incarceration in a treatment program that demands no real
responsibility.46
B. Court Interpretation
While the function of the legislature is to create law, it is left to the
judiciary to interpret that law and apply it in a practical setting. Though
Proposition 36 includes language about “drug-related conditions of
probation” and “amenability” it is up to the courts to determine how they
will decipher those clauses and apply them to minor drug offenders. Thus
there is potential for the original intent of voters in passing Proposition
36 to get lost in court interpretation of the statutory language.
The Court of Appeals of California, Fifth Appellate District in
People v. Dagostino47 began with an analysis of Proposition 36 and of
drug-related conditions of probation within the meaning of Cal. Penal
Code section 1210.1.48 Here the court focused on the language of Section
1210.1 to determine both the purpose of Proposition 36 and the standard
under which the case should be decided. The Dagostino court cited
People v. Goldberg in finding that the intent of Proposition 36 was to
“divert into treatment those persons whose only offenses were nonviolent
drug possession offenses.”49 Thus, defendants who were convicted of
45. It should be noted that when a court has found a defendant has violated his or her
Proposition 36 probation once, twice, or even three or more times, the court “may intensify or alter
the drug treatment plan” including imposing sanctions “including jail sanctions that may not exceed
120 hours of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance” in the case of a
violation that does not involve the recent use of drugs. § 1210.1(f)(3)(B). If the violation does
involve recent drug use (on the first, second or third violation), the court “may order that the
defendant be confined in a county jail for detoxification purposes only, if the jail offers
detoxification services, for a period not to exceed 10 days.” Id.
46. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.4, V.
47. 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
48. Id. at 986.
49. Id. at 986–87 (citing People v. Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003);
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such offenses were generally placed on probation until completion of a
drug treatment program instead of being sent to state prison or county
jail.50
“Anticipating that drug abusers often initially falter in their
recovery,”51 the legislature designed Proposition 36 to give offenders
several chances at probation before allowing a court to impose jail
time.52 Additionally, Proposition 36 probation was only to be revoked in
accordance with the terms of the statutory scheme,53 and then only after
engaging in several motions and hearings.54 This works in favor of the
drug offender by providing him leeway through imposition of a
statutorily narrow framework of revocation.

People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
50. Id. at 987.
51. In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1397 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003); See discussion infra Part
III.B.1.
52. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(C) (West
2004) reads:
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and violates that probation either
by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense, or a misdemeanor for simple
possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or
failure to register as a drug offender, or any activity similar to those listed in subdivision
(d) of Section 1210, or by violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state
moves to revoke probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether
probation shall be revoked. The trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation
violation is proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant poses a danger to the safety of others. If the court does not revoke probation, it
may intensify or alter the drug treatment plan . . .
If defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and for the second time violates
that probation either by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense . . . or by
violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves to revoke probation,
the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether probation shall be revoked. The
trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation violation is proved and the state
proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendant poses a danger to the
safety of others or is unamenable to drug treatment . . .
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and for the third or subsequent
time violates that probation either by committing a nonviolent drug possession offense, or
by violating a drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves for a third or
subsequent time to revoke probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine
whether probation shall be revoked. If the alleged probation violation is proved, the
defendant is not eligible for continued probation under subdivision (a) unless the court
determines that the defendant is not a danger to the community and would benefit from
further treatment under subdivision (a).
53. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987.
54. Id. at 974. See generally § 1210.1(f)(3)(A)–(F).

542

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

1. Drug-related conditions of probation simply mark a probationer’s
progress through the system
California courts have determined that under Proposition 36 a
defendant has three chances to violate a drug-related condition of
probation before the court even regains the discretion to impose jail or
prison time.55 On the other hand a defendant who is found to have
violated a non-drug-related condition is eligible for incarceration on the
first offense.56 In fact, in such a case the defendant “stands in the same
shoes as any other probationer”57 and is subject to whatever sentencing
the court chooses to impose—including incarceration or lifting the stay
on a previously imposed term of incarceration.58 Thus the question of
whether a violation is drug-related or not is pivotal in determining a
probationer’s Proposition 36 status.
2. Statewide application by the courts of the statutory “drug-related”
conditions
The California court of appeals system is divided into six districts:
San Francisco, Los Angeles and Ventura, Sacramento, San
Diego/Riverside/Santa Ana, Fresno, and San Jose.59 Although the
districts are in place to ensure “that the law is interpreted and applied
consistently and uniformly,”60 the district courts are not mandatorily
bound by each others’ decisions or precedent. Although one court’s rule
may be influential in another district, it will not be mandatory authority.
That leaves room for slight, but present, discrepancies between courts.
The findings of seven different courts from four different districts are
analyzed herein.
55. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 987 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 987–88 (under Proposition 36 the first time a probationer violates a non-drugrelated condition of probation, the court has discretion to incarcerate the person; they are not
extended the same grace as those who violate drug-related conditions). Specifically, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1210.1(e)(2) states:
If a defendant receives probation under subdivision (a), and violates that probation either
by being arrested for an offense that is not a nonviolent drug possession offense, or by
violating a non-drug-related condition of probation, and the state moves to revoke
probation, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether probation shall be
revoked. The court may modify or revoke probation if the alleged violation is proved.
§ 1210.1(e)(2).
57. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 988 (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. GovEngine.com, State Courts: California, http://www.govengine.com/statecourts/
california.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
60. California Courts, Courts: Court of Appeals, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/
courtsofappeal/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
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a. The third district. In People v. Dixon, the third district court
(Sacramento) held that a defendant’s requirement to report to his
probation officer by mail could not have involved drug testing and did
not indicate any particular connection to drug problems or drug
treatment.61 Therefore the court held that it did not have to analyze
whether the general condition of in-person reporting to a probation
officer qualified as a non-drug-related condition, because the mail-in
requirement was clearly not a drug-related condition and Proposition 36
was properly revoked so the court had the discretion to incarcerate
Dixon.62 In People v. Davis, the third district court determined that the
defendant had violated a drug-related condition by failing to submit to
drug testing or to report to drug court as required by his drug treatment
regime.63 However, the court determined that since this was the
defendant’s “first violation of a drug-related condition of probation . . .
the trial court’s only option was to require defendant to participate in a
drug treatment program as an additional condition of probation.”64 The
court argued that Penal Code section 1210.1(e)(3)(D) “must be read to
override the court’s general discretion to revoke probation”65 given that
“where reasonably possible, we avoid statutory constructions that render
particular provisions superfluous or unnecessary.”66 Thus, since a
defendant can only be taken off Proposition 36 after one violation of
probation (“one” being construed broadly enough to include a failed drug
test and two failures to appear in drug court67) if he or she is found to be
a danger to others,68 a violation of a drug-related condition of probation
allowed this defendant to continue being treated and avoid incarceration.
b. The second district. The second district court (Los Angeles and
Ventura) in In re Taylor ruled comparably, stating that section 1210.1(f)
“broadly” defines drug-related conditions and that the failure to report to
a probation officer could be a drug-related condition depending on the
nature of the meeting.69 It was already clear that the defendant in this
case had violated drug-related conditions of probation by failing to
appear for several drug tests and twice testing positive for cocaine. What
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

113 Cal. App. 4th 146, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
Id.
People v. Davis, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 1449.
Id. at 1448 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Dix v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 3d. 442, 459 (1991)).
Id. at 1445.
Id. at 1447; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(D) (West 2004).
105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1398 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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was not clear was whether the defendant’s failure to report to his
probation officer for a drug test was a drug-related condition.70 If failing
to report to the probation officer was a non-drug-related condition of
probation then the court would regain its discretion to incarcerate
Taylor.71 The court in Taylor acknowledged that there could be many
reasons an individual is required to report to a probation officer—none of
which may be drug-related—but in Taylor, where the defendant was
reporting for drug testing, his failure to appear “satisfie[d] the definition
of a drug-related condition of probation.”72
This approach was followed by the Court of Appeals, Third District,
in People v. Atwood. In Atwood, the court decided that the defendant’s
failure to attend outpatient counseling and enter treatment was definitely
a drug-related condition of probation.73 If the defendant’s failure to
attend four outpatient group sessions and positive test for
methamphetamine and marijuana were her only violations then the court
would be bound to reinstate her Proposition 36 probation.74 However, the
defendant’s failure to keep a scheduled appointment with her probation
officer could be a drug-related violation depending on the reason for the
appointment.75 Where the record did not disclose the purpose behind the
appointment, the court remanded the case back to the trial court to allow
the prosecution an opportunity to fulfill both the burden of production
and of persuasion in showing the violation to be non-drug-related.76
c. The fourth district. The fourth district court (San Diego) in People
v. Johnson held that the defendant’s failure to report to her probation
officer was not a drug-related condition of probation.77 The court held
that the defendant’s reliance on Taylor was misplaced and that there was
no evidence that the defendant’s appointment with the probation officer
was for drug-testing or any other drug-related reason.78 As a result the
court excluded the defendant from further Proposition 36 treatment
stating that “such a result is consistent with the intent and purpose of
Proposition 36.”79 In this case, although Johnson had violated the
70. Id. at 1396.
71. Id. at 1398.
72. Id. at 1393; see also In re Mehdizadeh, 105 Cal. App. 4th 995, 1001 (2d Dist. 2003) (a
defendant’s failure to report to his probation officer for drug testing constitutes a drug-related
condition of probation).
73. 110 Cal. App. 4th 805, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
74. Id. at 808, 810.
75. Id. at 811.
76. Id. at 813.
77. 114 Cal. App. 4th 284, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
78. Id. at 299.
79. Id. at 300.
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conditions of her Proposition 36 probation a first time by failing to enroll
in court-ordered drug treatment, failing to complete intake in two
previous grants of Proposition 36 probation, failing to participate in and
complete drug treatment,80 and then a second time by again failing to
enroll in drug treatment,81 it was not those violations that ousted Johnson
from Proposition 36. It was Johnson’s non-drug related violations that
rendered her ineligible for further drug treatment.82
d. The first district. Additionally, in People v. Goldberg, the first
district court (San Francisco), in dictum, stated that a general condition
requiring the defendant to report to his probation officer was not a drugrelated condition.83 Thus, although Goldberg violated his probation by
testing positive for methamphetamine, it was not the drug use that caused
his Proposition 36 probation to be revoked.84
e. The fifth district. The fifth district court (Fresno) in Dagostino
reasoned that, unlike the previously cited cases of Dixon, Goldberg, and
Johnson,85 defendant Dagostino “was not required to report to the
‘gatekeeper’ as a general condition of probation.”86 In contrast,
Dagostino was required to meet with the gatekeeper only for an initial
evaluation for placement into an appropriate drug treatment program.
The court also looked more specifically at what constitutes a “drugrelated condition of probation”, stating that according to the statutory
language a drug-related condition included “a probationer’s specific drug

80. Id. at 291. The first revocation and reinstatement of Proposition 36 probation came at a
March 6 hearing. When Johnson failed to appear in court a bench warrant was issued and on April
24 Johnson appeared and admitted violating her Proposition 36 probation. The court formally
revoked that probation but then reinstated it on the same terms and conditions. Id. at 292.
81. Id. The second revocation hearing on May 22 alleged that Johnson failed to report to the
probation department and failed to enroll in court-ordered drug treatment. Johnson failed to appear
in court on May 22 and later appeared before the court on a bench warrant on July 24. The trial court
formally revoked Johnson’s Proposition 36 probation. Id.
82. Id. at 300.
83. 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202, 1209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
84. Id. at 1205 (In this case the court determined that “[g]ranting Proposition 36 treatment to
a probationer who, like Goldberg, was convicted of a crime unrelated to drug possession as well as a
drug possession offense, would be directly contrary to the purpose of the statute.”). Id. at 1208. The
court also noted:
[a]lthough the parties do not address the issue, Goldberg’s probation was revoked not
only for violation of a drug-related condition . . . but also for failing to report to his
probation officer. . . . The court should have no less power to redress the violation of a
non-drug-related probation condition where, as here, the probation was never entitled to
Proposition 36 treatment in the first place.
Id. at 1209.
85. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
86. Id. at 993.
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treatment regimen, employment, vocational training, educational
programs, psychological counseling, and family counseling.”87 Thus, the
court reasoned that reporting to the gatekeeper was Dagostino’s first
crucial step to placement into a treatment program and that failing to
meet that requirement was a violation of a drug-related condition of
probation.88 Since failing to meet with the Mental Health Gatekeeper and
failing to participate in Proposition 36 treatment programs on two prior
occasions constituted only the second probation violation, Dagostino was
once again reinstated on Proposition 36.89
3. The California courts are consistent in their analysis: drug-related
violations of probation keep offenders on Proposition 36.
The general trend amongst the courts appeared to be that evaluating
violations as drug-related or non-drug-related depended on the nature of
the meeting with the authority figure (the most common instance being
that of probation officers).90 The statutory language of section 1210.1(f)
suggests that violation of any part of “a probationer’s specific drug
treatment regimen”91 would constitute a drug-related violation. It follows
then, that the courts are consistent in their interpretation of the statutory
language; to them a drug-related violation depends on whether that
violation is directly related to any part of the course of drug treatment.
Additionally, in evaluating such drug-related conditions, the
prosecution has the burden of persuasion and of producing evidence that
the defendant’s violation “did not involve a drug-related condition of
probation.”92 Thus, in addition to allowing the defendant some leeway in

87. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f) (West 2004)).
88. Id. (“The record indicates that appellant [Dagostino] would not be placed in the
appropriate Proposition 36 program until he met with the ‘gatekeeper,’ who would evaluate his
circumstances and determine the requisite treatment level.”).
89. Id. at 980–81.
90. Id. at 989–92 (citing People v. Atwood, 110 Cal. App. 4th 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(defendant’s failure to keep an appointment with the probation officer could have been drug related
but the record failed to state the purpose for the appointment); People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th
284 (4th Dist. 2004) (failing to report to a probation officer was not a drug-related condition); People
v. Dixon, 113 Cal. App. 4th 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (failing to report by mail was not a drugrelated condition); In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (failing to appear for a
drug test is a drug-related condition, but the nature of the defendant’s appointment with the
probation officer determines whether it is a violation of a drug-related condition); People v.
Goldberg, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (requiring defendant to report to his
probation officer was not a drug-related condition); People v. Davis, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (failing to appear in drug court is not a drug-related condition)).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f) (West 2004) (defines a drug-related conditions of
probation).
92. Atwood, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 812; § 1210.1(f).
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Proposition 36 through the three (or more) chances rule,93 the court
system also leans in favor of the defendant by thrusting the burden of
proof and persuasion on the prosecution and assumes a drug-related
condition unless shown otherwise. Once the court has determined that
the defendant violated a drug-related condition of probation, he is to be
lawfully reinstated on probation pursuant to Proposition 36, unless the
trial court finds that defendant a danger to others or unamenable to
treatment.94
4. Amenability ignored
Is the elusive amenability factor harder to prove than drug related
conditions of probation? Although the courts fairly extensively address
the question of drug-related conditions of probation and the subsequent
effects those violations have on probation pursuant to Proposition 36, as
a general rule the courts decline a discussion on the amenability of the
defendant to drug treatment. Instead, as in Dagostino,95 the courts may
mention that a drug offender’s amenability to treatment can affect
probationary status, but they avoid any definitive analysis as to whether
or not a particular drug offender (and defendant) is amenable to
treatment. While such analysis may simply be dropped as a repetitive and
unnecessary part of the courts’ opinions, it would seem that a precedent
has been set for Proposition 36 analysis. The courts are simply following
the general judicial trend of opting to analyze drug possession offenses
and drug-related conditions of probation rather than discuss amenability.
Whereas the courts in Atwood, Davis, Goldberg, and Mehdizadeh all
dealt with first time violations and therefore were not statutorily
permitted to discuss a defendant’s amenability to Proposition 36, the
courts in Johnson, Taylor, and Dagostino all dealt with second time
violations and were properly suited to a discussion on amenability.
The court in Johnson found that as additional support to their
conclusion that Proposition 36 was revoked, the record showed that
“Johnson . . . demonstrated a ‘complete and unequivocal refusal to
undergo drug treatment,’ thereby rendering herself ineligible for further
probation under Proposition 36.”96 This statement was made following
the precedent of People v. Guzman where the defendant Guzman “failed
to comply with any of the trial court’s directives,”97 including a failure to
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 1397.
Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 993.
Id. at 996.
People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th 284, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
Id. (citing People v. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th 341, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)).
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report to drug treatment, failure to report to his probation officer and
appearing in court only on a bench warrant.98 Since both Guzman and
Johnson had refused drug treatment by not even enrolling in drug
treatment programs, both were found “not amenable to treatment
pursuant to Proposition 36.”99 In the case of Johnson, the defendant’s
unamenability is not the deciding factor in revoking probation but is only
“support” of the conclusion.
In Taylor, despite an argument from the state that the trial court
“implicitly found Taylor was unamenable to further treatment,”100 the
appellate court stated that because the trial court reinstated Taylor’s
probation on the same terms and conditions as before (with the exception
that they tried to also impose jail time), it was evident that the trial court
did not believe Taylor was unamenable to treatment.101 All discussion of
amenability ended there.
Perhaps the lack of amenability analysis is a wise assessment since a
defendant who has violated a drug-related condition of probation for only
the second documented time is still eligible for Proposition 36. The court
seems to take the approach that since the defendant is eligible for
reinstatement then, naturally, she should be reinstated. However, it seems
that the voter intent in passing Proposition 36 legislation was, in fact, to
assess amenability of potential participants and avoid offenders who
would “burden the drug treatment system.”102 Though amenability seems
to be treated lightly by the courts—more as a way to ensure that all bases
are covered than as a necessary element of Proposition 36 analysis—the
implication in the language of the statute is that amenability is the
deciding factor once a drug-related condition has been established.103 At
the very least the language of the statute states that following the
establishment of two violations of drug-related conditions of probation,
the state must also prove that the defendant is unamenable to drug
treatment or is a danger to society.104 Where the statute specifically

98. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 343.
99. Id.; see also Johnson, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 300.
100. In re Taylor, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1399 (2d Dist. 2003).
101. Id. (“It makes no sense for the court to order continued treatment if the court believed
Taylor was unamenable.”).
102. Moore v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 401, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
103. See Guzman, 35 Cal. 4th at 585 (“After a second such violation, the mandatory probation
provision applies unless ‘the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the
defendant poses a danger to the safety of others or is unamenable to drug treatment.’”) (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(E) (West 2004) (emphasis added)).
104. § 1210.1(f)(3)(E) (“The trial court shall revoke probation if the alleged probation
violation is proved and the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendant
poses a danger to the safety of others or that the defendant is unamenable to drug treatment.”
(emphasis added)).
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prescribes the factors relevant to a drug-offender’s eligibility for
Proposition 36, it would seem that a discussion of a defendant’s
amenability to such treatment would be a crucial element of a court’s
analysis—especially in light of the court’s role—namely, to “ascertain
and declare what is in the terms and substance of a statute.”105 Thus,
while it is not the function of the appellate court to introduce new
elements or make new arguments, in Taylor and Dagostino the courts
had the opportunity to discuss the arguments made by the state (that the
defendants were unamenable to treatment) and yet declined to go into
any depth as to what constitutes amenability and why it did not apply in
those respective cases.
It would have been helpful in the case of Taylor or Dagostino if the
court had discussed what factors or evidences are at play in determining
a defendant’s amenability to drug treatment. The implication, given that
the courts did not find Taylor nor Dagostino unamenable, is that even
multiple instances of failed drug tests, missed meetings, and broken
commitments do not render a defendant “unamenable” despite “minimal
effort on the first [Proposition 36] opportunity and no effort on the
second.”106 If it is possible to be placed on Proposition 36 and avoid jail
time while showing a complete disregard for the rules and requirements
of Proposition 36 by failing to report to the probation department,
repeatedly testing positive for the very drug one was charged with
possessing when initially arrested, failing to appear for required drug
tests, and missing counseling sessions,107 then the question is what does
make a defendant unamenable?
A possible answer lies in Guzman, where the court found that the
“the trial court can terminate the probation of a defendant who, by his
conduct following the grant of probation refuses to undergo
treatment.”108 However the court makes it clear that “[s]uch a defendant
105. People v. Foreman, 126 Cal. App. 4th 338, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
106. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974, 981 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (After being given
two opportunities to participate in treatment and failing both chances, “[t]he probation officer
concluded appellant was ‘unamenable to treatment at this time,’ and recommended his exclusion
from further treatment”).
107. Id. at 980–82.
108. 109 Cal. App. 4th at 349–50. The court stated:
In this case, defendant made no effort whatsoever to comply with his drug treatment
probation. He instead absconded from the jurisdiction of the trial court by leaving the
United States. Moreover, regardless of his reasons for doing so, upon his return to this
country, he did not report voluntarily to his probation officer, the drug treatment center or
the trial court. He persisted, rather, in disregarding the trial court’s orders and the
requirements accompanying his grant of probation pursuant to Proposition 36. Hence,
this is not a case in which a defendant commences drug treatment and falters. This is not
a case in which a defendant responded to a family emergency and then voluntarily
reported to his probation officer for supervision or the drug treatment center for
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is to be distinguished from a defendant who commences drug treatment
and thereafter falters by violating conditions of probation. The
transgressions of such a defendant would be analyzed as probation
violations pursuant to section 1210.1, subdivision (e).”109 Thus, although
in this instance the court found the defendant unamenable, and therefore
ineligible for continued Proposition 36 probation, the court explicitly
states that this finding is unique to those defendants who never even start
treatment.110
Indeed the courts as a whole111 continue to fail to explore the purpose
of the amenability clause. If the interpretation is to be so broadly
construed that a defendant “must be found unamenable to ‘any and all
forms of treatment’ before he or she may be excluded under this
[amenability] provision,”112 then what is the purpose of including it in the
language of the statute? The courts seem intent on following the will of
the voters in enacting the Proposition 36 legislation when it comes to the
plain language of drug-related violations and yet fail to consider what
purpose the electorate may have envisioned in stating that defendants
must also be “amenable” to treatment in order to stay on Proposition 36.
Until amenability is included in the analysis of a probationer’s
Proposition 36 eligibility, the Act will have no way of imposing on drugoffenders a sense of accountability.

treatment. This is a case in which defendant, by his acts and omissions, evinced a
complete and unequivocal refusal to undergo drug treatment.
Id.
109. Id. See § 1210.1(f).
110. Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 349–50.
111. The exception being Guzman, 109 Cal. App. 4th at 341 (as discussed supra Part III.B.4).
112. Gregory A. Forest, Comment, Proposition 36 Eligibility: Are Courts and Prosecutors
Following or Frustrating the Will of Voters?, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 660 (2005). See People v.
Tanner, 129 Cal. App. 4th 223, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), where the appellate court found that the
trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation based on the sheer number of drug related
probations. Although the trial court minutes state that Tanner was unamenable to Penal Code 1210.1
treatment, the oral pronouncement of the court showed that the court:
did not reach the issue of amenability because it had already revoked Tanner’s probation
based on his admissions to a third and fourth violation of drug-related conditions of his
probation under the Act. . . . Although there are statements in the probation report that
could support a court finding Tanner was unamenable to treatment under the Act, there
are also statements supporting Tanner’s continued attempts for further treatment. Thus,
on this record we cannot find the trial court even impliedly found Tanner was
unamenable to drug treatment under the Act.
Id. at 237.
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IV. EVALUATION AND AMENDMENTS
A. Six Years Later
After six years of implementation, the legislature has taken on the
task of evaluating the effectiveness of Proposition 36 in treating drug
offenders and deciding if the program merits further funding and what, if
any, changes should be made. When Proposition 36 went into effect in
July of 2001, the state allocated $120 million annually for treatment
services up until July of 2006. When the initial funding ran out it was up
to the legislature to decide how to continue to fund the program.113
Despite a touting of the Act’s success by pro-Proposition 36 groups,
requests for budgetary expansion were denied and funding continued at
the same rate.114 In fact, the “success” of Proposition 36 really depends
on who you ask and what statistics they are choosing to cite. For
example, pro-Proposition 36 groups point out that over 35,000 people
enter treatment each year and after six years of the program running
“over 150,000 people benefited from Prop 36 treatment and California
taxpayers saved about $1.3 billion.”115 But on the other hand, antiProposition groups will argue that Proposition 36 has been a failure,
because “the failure rate of people sent to Proposition 36 programs
exceeds 75% (worse than California’s felony recidivism percentages).”116
According to the initial UCLA report on the Act covering
implementation of Proposition 36 through June 2002, studies “suggest

113. Id.
114. Id. In an effort to amend certain provisions of Proposition 36 the legislature enacted S.B.
1137 in which they approved increasing the current funding of $120 million a year to $145 million a
year. Laura Mecoy, Drug Policy Alliance Files Suit to Protect Prop 36, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jun. 29,
2006, available at http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2006/06/drug_policy_all.html. Despite
the offer for increased funding (with the accompanying provisional changes), drug treatment
program administrators and providers stated that they would need $209.3 million to adequately fund
Proposition 36. Id. S.B. 1137 never came to fruition. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
115. Prop36.org, supra note 3.
116. California Narcotics Officers’ Association, What’s New at CNOA, http://www.cnoa.org/
whats-new-7-1-06.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter CNOA]. What is meant by “failure” is
not discussed further in this article. However, according to the California Department of Alcohol and
Drug Programs,
SACPA defines ‘successful completion of treatment’ to mean that the defendant ‘. . . has
completed the prescribed course of drug treatment and, as a result, there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant will not abuse controlled substances in the future.’
The treatment community recognizes that relapse is a common feature of addiction.
Indeed, relapse—a return to addictive behavior—may sometimes be a step (or misstep)
on the path to recovery, rather than a failure. It is not uncommon for an individual to
alternate between treatment and relapse before completely recovering. The Department
anticipates that treatment success will be further defined at the local level.
SACPA, FAQ, supra note 17, at 5.
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that 90 days may be a minimum threshold for effective treatment,”117 and
yet while 65.1% of outpatient drug-free “clients” received at least 90
days of treatment, only 42.8% of long-term residential clients received
90 days of treatment.118 The study does not say how many of those who
made it through at least 90 days of treatment were then successful in
avoiding relapses and reappearances in court for probation violations.
The implication is that despite the availability of this new “public health
approach toward handling drug offenders,”119 when only 42.8% of drug
addicts are even making it 90 days, even fewer are finding any true help
in the program.
Perhaps, though, the voter intent in enacting Proposition 36 was not
to help “most people,” but only to help someone. The UCLA 2002
Report also pointed out that the first year of the Act a total of 53,697
defendants were found to be eligible for Proposition 36 treatment, and
82% of them chose to participate.120 Of those who chose to participate in
the treatment, only 69% actually entered treatment.121 Perhaps most
significant in that report was the finding that “[t]reatment duration was
similar among SACPA clients and non-SACPA clients.”122 Thus, one
could surmise that being placed on Proposition 36 by the court really
does not make much of a difference in treatment from those drug addicts
who choose to be treated of their own accord; until drug offenders want
to be treated no system is going to help them get better and stay out of
prison.123
117. UCLA EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT 2002
REPORT 39(2003), available at http://www.csdp.org/research/prop36_rpt1.pdf [hereinafter UCLA
REPORT 2002]. While UCLA has conducted yearly evaluation reports on SACPA, the reports focus
more on “analyses of cost-offset, client outcomes, implementation, and lessons learned” and less on
the courts’ functional interpretation of Proposition 36. Id. at 3. Consequently the UCLA results are
not discussed in depth in this comment.
118. Id. at 42 (“[O]ver 90% of SACPA [Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act]
treatment clients were placed in outpatient drug-free and long-term residential treatment.”).
119. Prop36.org, supra note 3.
120. UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 8.
121. Id. (“Among offenders who chose SACPA, 85% (37,495) completed assessment, and
81% (30,469) of assessed offenders entered treatment. Overall, 69% of offenders who opted for
SACPA in court entered treatment.”).
122. Id. The only real distinction between SACPA clients and non-SACPA clients is that
SACPA clients are those individuals who qualify for Proposition 36 treatment based on the statutory
language of California Penal Code §§ 1210 and 1210.1 and who choose to participate in the
program. Id. at 9-10.
123. See also DOUGLAS LONGSHORE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
CRIME PREVENTION ACT 2004 REPORT iii-iv (2005), available at http://www.uclaisap.org/Prop36/
documents/sacpa080405.pdf [hereinafter UCLA REPORT 2004]. Regarding the similarity between
SACPA offenders and non-SACPA drug users:
Overall, about one-quarter (24.9%) of offenders who agreed to participate in SACPA in
its second year completed treatment (based on a 72.6% treatment entry rate among all
SACPA offenders and a 34.3% completion rate among offenders who entered treatment).
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The statistics for the success of the Act become even bleaker as time
goes on. In UCLA’s 2004 Report, only about one-third of offenders
(34.3%) who entered Proposition 36 treatment in the second year of the
Act went on to complete treatment.124 In fact, “[o]verall, about onequarter (24.9%) of offenders who agreed to participate in SACPA in its
second year completed treatment.”125 The implication, again, is that
although the Act is helping some people, most drug offenders are placed
on Proposition 36 with little motivation to actually get better. As a result,
in its third year of implementation, over one in five Proposition 36
probationers eventually have their probation revoked.126 That means that,
given the multiple chances and violation hearings in court, a significant
number of probationers play out all their options and end up incarcerated
anyway. It cannot be denied that Proposition 36 has helped some
offenders, but the fact that so many do not complete treatment and a fair
number eventually have their probation revoked indicates that the system
is not working the way California voters initially envisioned.127
As a “ground-breaking” model for other states, the success or failure
of Proposition 36 has the potential to set the standard for a “treatmentinstead-of-incarceration” program on a state-wide and even national
level.128 According to a recent survey, 63% of Americans consider drug
abuse “a problem that should be addressed primarily through counseling
and treatment, rather than the criminal justice system.”129 Thus many
This rate is typical of drug users referred to treatment by criminal justice.
Id. Additionally there appears to be no difference in cost between SACPA clients and non-SACPA:
State statutes enacted prior to SACPA require drug treatment programs (except Drug
Medi-Cal) to assess fees toward the cost of treatment based on the client’s ability to pay
in accordance with state statute. Such fees are to be deducted from the program’s cost of
providing services. Under the regulations implementing SACPA, counties are required to
use fees assessed by trial judges toward the costs of placement. Placement costs include
court or probation department costs to ensure a client is enrolled in drug treatment.
SACPA, FAQ, supra note 17, at 2.
124. UCLA REPORT 2004, supra note 123, at iii (“The completion rate was about the same
(34.4%) in SACPA’s first year.”).
125. Id. at iv (these statistics are “based on a 72.6% treatment entry rate among all SACPA
offenders and a 34.3% completion rate among offenders who entered treatment”).
126. Id. at v.
127. Given the language of the original text for the Proposition 36 Ballot Initiative, it is not a
stretch to think that voters had high hopes for the success of the proposition in rehabilitating drug
offenders, saving money by avoiding incarceration, and reducing drug-related crime. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
128. Drug Policy Alliance, Reform in California, http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate/
california/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see also Prop36.org, Addressing Your State’s Budget Crisis:
Treatment Instead of Incarceration, http://www.prop36.org/treatment_instead.html (Maryland has
passed a new treatment law diverting several thousand prisoners into drug treatment; New York
governor announced a plan to divert nonviolent drug offenders to drug treatment over a three year
period, but the legislature denied it).
129. Prop36.org, supra note 3(citing to a survey conducted by Open Society Institute,
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states are watching California’s Proposition 36, as well as Arizona’s
similar statute ,130 to see how these new drug laws will work and if they
are worth emulating.131
The effectiveness of Proposition 36 in rehabilitating minor drug
offenders hinges on the courts’ functional interpretation of the statutory
language, and in their effort to decipher voter intent. Although there are
many reasons a drug offender might not complete treatment (and
therefore seem a “failure” to Proposition 36132), many of the
effectiveness issues could be worked out if the courts were willing to
address amenability and distinguish between those offenders struggling
to overcome their addictions and those working the system for as long as
statutorily allowed. The courts’ Proposition 36 decisions will not only
affect those who stand before them, but more importantly in light of new
and pending legislation in California, they will also affect the direction in
which the program will go from here.133

Changing Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System).
130. Arizona’s Proposition 200, the Drug Medicalization Prevention and Control Act of 1996,
was also implemented to send first and second time non-violent drug offenders to treatment instead
of prison. See id. A recent report conducted by the Supreme Court of Arizona found that Proposition
200 saved Arizona taxpayers $6.7 million in 1999 and 62% of probationers successfully completed
their court ordered drug treatment. Id.
131. Tamara Karel, The Failure of Ohio’s Drug Treatment Initiative, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
203, 234 (2004) states:
Ohio would be well served to sit back and watch the laws of Arizona and California in
place. Ohio legislators and judges would benefit from seeing these laws in action,
observing the flaws and strengths of drug treatment probation for first and second-time
offenders. The General Assembly can then make decisions based on educated facts and
data. . . . Next time, it should be done as a law rather than a constitutional amendment.
See also Prop36.org, supra note 3 (two states, Maryland and New York have also recently tried
implementation of like programs:
Maryland’s new treatment law immediately diverts several thousand prisoners into drug
treatment, saving the state’s taxpayers millions of dollars a year in the process. It also
provides $3 million in additional funding for treatment and gives judges new discretion in
sentencing.
New York state recently announced that three planned prison closings, made possible by
the state shifting almost 7,000 nonviolent drug offenders from prison to drug treatment
over a three-year period, will save the state a projected $18 million.
Unfortunately the announcement was premature. This move was proposed by the
Governor, but denied by the legislature.).
132. See supra note 116.
133. Prop36.org, supra note 3.
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B. California Senate Bill 1137
Because of concerns with the effectiveness of Proposition 36, the
California legislature “overwhelmingly approved”134 Senate Bill No.
1137 (S.B. 1137), authored by Senator Denise Ducheny, in 2006.135 S.B.
1137 amended Proposition 36 to give judges more discretion when they
were sentencing repeat offenders, including “discretion to send relapsing
offenders to jail for ‘flash incarcerations’ for up to five days.”136 The
legislature declared that their purpose in enacting S.B. 1137 was to
“improve outcomes and promote accountability consistent with the act
and to further the purposes of the act.”137 The bill laid out several reforms
including: closer judicial monitoring and collaboration with probation
and treatment centers; greater judicial discretion to provide offenders
with more opportunities after a third drug-related violation; hearings to
remove offenders after a first offense who will not benefit from
treatment; brief jail sanctions; and mandated drug testing. All of this
having the intent to “enhance accountability,” “assure accountability,”
“improve offender outcomes,” and provide “a motivational tool to
improve the number of defendants who enter treatment, remain in
treatment, and complete treatment and probation consistent with the
purposes of the act.”138 Ducheny stated that with the enactment of these
134. CNOA, supra note 116.
135. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137 (West); see also Open Minds Industry
Resources Library, California Senate Bill No. 1137, http://www.openminds.com/indres/CAsb_1137.
htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); CNOA, supra note 116.
136. Lisa Richardson, Jail Provision Angers Drug Reform Advocates, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 29,
2006 at 4. The bill provides changing the wording of Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(f)(3)(A), which
refers to defendants who are shown to have violated a drug-related condition of probation once, to
include that “the court may impose sanctions including jail sanctions that may not exceed 48 hours
of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance.” 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63,
S.B. 1137 (West). On a second violation the bill changes the wording of Cal. Penal Code §
1210.1(f)(3)(B) to include the court’s ability to “impose sanctions including jail sanctions that may
not exceed 120 hours of continuous custody as a tool to enhance treatment compliance.” Id. On a
third or subsequent violation the bill would change Cal. Penal Code § 1210.1(f)(3)(C) to add that
“the court may impose appropriate sanctions including jail sanctions as the court deems
appropriate.” Id.
137. 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137, § 1(j)(1) (West).
138. Id. at § 1(j)(1)–(5). The bill also lists in the Legislative Council’s Digest reforms in terms
of what the act says and how S.B. 1137 would change that, stating:
The act defines “successful completion of treatment” as a defendant who has completed
the prescribed course of treatment and, as a result, there is reasonable cause to believe
that the defendant will not abuse controlled substances in the future
This bill would instead define “successful completion of treatment” as a defendant who
has completed the prescribed course of treatment. Completion of treatment would not
mean cessation of narcotic replacement. . . .
This bill would require drug testing as a condition of probation. The bill would require a
person subject to the act to be monitored by the court, as specified. . . .
Under the act, if a defendant violates probation, as specified, the court may revoke
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new provisions, the legislature’s “intention is not to punish, but to give
judges tools to encourage successful treatment. That’s what California
voters wanted.”139
Despite the legislature’s finding that the pre-S.B. 1137 form of
Proposition 36 was lacking140, some groups were unhappy with these
attempts to reform the law.141 In fact, the Drug Policy Alliance argued
probation or it may intensify or alter the drug treatment plan.
This bill would authorize a court to also order incarceration for a specified period, in
order to enhance treatment compliance, and in some circumstances, to order the
defendant to enter a residential drug treatment program, if available, or be placed in a
county jail for not more than 10 days for detoxification purposes only.
139. Evan Halper, Judge Bars Tougher Drug Rehab Law, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at 3.
Many judges, district attorneys, public defenders, probation officers and law enforcement agencies
have been critical of Proposition 36 since its enactment and have been lobbying for change for years.
Richardson, supra note 136, at 4. Ducheny was also quoted as saying in reference to S.B. 1137,
“[f]undamentally, this is not giving them jail time for the drug offense but to say, ‘Look, we gave
you that opportunity and you decided, for whatever reason, not to take advantage of it . . . You didn’t
meet your responsibility to us, so we need some accountability.’” Id.
140. S.B. 1137 § 1(e)–(g) reads:
(e) The UCLA evaluations have found that approximately 30 percent of referred SACPA
offenders do not enter treatment. Judicial monitoring, through dedicated court calendars,
collaboration and coordination between the courts, probation and treatment, as
demonstrated by drug courts, would enhance entry, retention, and completion of
treatment by offenders.
(f) The UCLA evaluations have found that 34 percent of those who do in fact enter
treatment complete that treatment. This completion rate, as well as retention rates, can be
improved through the enhancement of compliance with treatment, as well as tailoring
treatment to the needs of offenders following drug-related violations of probation to
assure that the level and duration of treatment they are assessed or reassessed to
overcome addiction, including detoxification and residential services, are provided, and
that treatment be of sufficient duration to meet individual needs of defendants.
(g) SACPA does not specifically address the use of short periods of jail time as a
motivational tool to hold SACPA offenders accountable to enter and stay in treatment.
Studies have reported that drug court clients were more likely to enter treatment,
remained in treatment significantly longer, and engaged in significantly less drug use
when they received swift and sure sanctions and rewards, including the possibility of
brief periods of jail time during the course of treatment. Therefore, sanctions including
short periods of jail time for relapsing, problematic, or recalcitrant offenders, on a
showing of need after consideration of important treatment and other factors, should be
available, not as a substitute for treatment but as a tool to motivate and hold offenders
accountable.
2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 63, S.B. 1137, §1(e)–(g) (West).
141. Frank D. Russo, Judge Upholds Vote of Californians on Prop 36 Drug Courts Against
Schwarzenegger Demanded Legislative Changes, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT, available at
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2006/09/judge_upholds_v.html (“Unless the Governor just
doesn’t know what he is doing here, you can only conclude that he has no respect for the vote of the
electorate on Prop 36. If he wanted to change the Proposition into something that the electorate did
not vote for, he has to go back to the people. He didn’t do that here.”); Dave Fratello, Jail Won’t
Cure Drug Users, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at 11 (“last week the governor signed a misguided bill
that puts jail back into the equation. . . . [M]ore than 60,000 people have graduated from drug
treatment, meaning the program is saving lives, not just money. With this track record of success, the
Legislature picked a strange time to rewrite Proposition 36.”); Laura Mecoy, Drug Policy Alliance
Files Suit to Protect Prop 36, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jun. 29, 2006, available at
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that the revised provisions resulted in “[f]ive years of work defeated by
secretive backroom process in the Legislature.”142
Hours after Governor Schwarzenegger signed the changes in S.B.
1137 into law, Cliff Gardner (the official ballot proponent of Proposition
36), the Drug Policy Alliance, and the California Society of Addiction
Medicine filed suit against Governor Schwarzenegger. Opponents of
S.B. 1137 alleged that the proposed changes would radically alter
Proposition 36 against the voters’ initial intent in enacting the Act and
that the attempt to change Proposition 36 was unconstitutional.143
Alameda County Superior Court Judge Winifred Smith issued a
temporary restraining order to keep S.B. 1137 from going into effect and
later entered a preliminary injunction against the Proposition 36
alterations while the court looked into the constitutionality issues.144
Thus, at present, S.B. 1137 has not taken effect and Proposition 36
continues in its original form.
C. Future Implications
Since S.B. 1137 has been blocked from implementation since July
2006,145 the ability of Proposition 36 to enforce any sort of accountability
rests squarely on the shoulders of the amenability clause. The Supreme
Court of California stated in People v. Canty that a reasonable
interpretation of the enacting body’s intent in passing Proposition 36 may
be evidenced not only in the statutory language itself, but also in the
history and background of the Act.146 Further, the court stated that
consideration should also be given to uncodified findings and statements
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2006/06/drug_policy_all.html (“The legislation’s goal is to
compel offenders to stay drug-free. But Proposition 36’s authors contend additional treatment is the
answer – not jail. ‘Jail is not part of treatment,’ said Margaret Dooley, Drug Policy Alliance
Proposition 36 outreach coordinator. ‘It doesn’t help people stop using drugs. If it did, we wouldn’t
have a recidivism problem.’”); see also Prop36.org, Prop 36 In the News,
http://www.prop36.org/news.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (lists various Pro-Proposition 36
articles).
142. Richardson, supra note 136, at 4 (quoting Bill Zimmerman, the political consultant who
managed the campaign for Proposition 36).
143. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 7, Gardner v. Schwarzenegger (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 12, 2006); see also Drug Policy Alliance, http://www.drugpolicy.org/law/
treatmentvsi/.
144. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Gardner et al. v. Schwarzenegger et al., RG06278911 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006); see also Drug Policy Alliance, Cliff Gardner et al. v.
Schwarzenegger et al., http://www.drugpolicy.org/law/treatmentvsi/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); see
also Judge Extends Block to Changes for Drug Treatment Law, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE,
available
at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20060914-2303-ca-schwarzeneggerdrugtreatment.html.
145. Open Minds Industry Resources Library, supra note 135.
146. 90 P.3d 1168, 1175 (Cal. 2004).
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of intent as presented to the voters.147 With Proposition 36, the legislature
adopted several uncodified findings and declarations in order to garner
voter endorsement—among those a concern for public health and safety
and a more efficient expenditure of taxpayer funds by treating minor
drug offenders instead of spending money to incarcerate and reincarcerate them.148 Given these objectives and the built in “chances” of
Proposition 36 (similar to the three-strikes rule, defendants are given
three drug-related violation probations before they are even eligible for
jail time or elimination from the Proposition 36 program149) it would
seem that the intent of Proposition 36 is a broad desire to rehabilitate
minor drug offenders.
If it is the intent of the voters to improve society at large through
alternative drug treatment measures, then is Proposition 36 in place to
include as many people as controllable with as much leeway as possible
while still maintaining a semblance of order in the court system? Or is
there any concern for the encouragement of members of society to show
some accountability for their actions? The California courts seem to
indicate that the statutory scheme (and thereby the intent of voters) is one
of inclusion: defendants participating in Proposition 36 probation,
despite multiple violations thereof,150 can only have that probation
revoked under a narrow set of conditions.151
Previous courts have determined that “Proposition 36 should not be
interpreted to frustrate the intent of the electorate. . . . An interpretation
that renders related provisions nugatory must be avoided . . . ; and if a
statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to
the more reasonable result will be followed.”152 Given this understanding
of the purpose of the Act and of the amenability language, it seems that
the courts neglected to take into account the electorate’s intent to factor
in a probationer’s accountability, responsibility, and compliance with a
program that offers them an alternative to prison. In those instances
where a defendant has not demonstrated a willingness to proactively
participate in Proposition 36 and be rehabilitated, a court should be open

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(f)(3)(F) (West 2004).
150. People v. Dagostino, 117 Cal. App. 4th 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The court includes
Dagostino’s discharge from the Desert Counseling Clinic for poor attendance, failure to report to the
probation department, repeated positive marijuana tests, failures to appear for drug tests and missed
appointments as one probation violation. Id. at 979.
151. Id. “Proposition 36 supersedes the trial court’s general power to revoke probation under
sections 1203.2 and 1203.3” and can only be annulled by a non-drug-related violation of probation
or after the defendant has been convicted of a third drug-related violation. Id. at 995.
152. People v. Glasper, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1104, 1114 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)(citations omitted).
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to a discussion on what makes that defendant remain yet amenable to
treatment.153 Instead, continued violations serve only to record a
defendant’s position in the statutory scheme; if this is only the first or
second violation hearing then Proposition 36 probation will be continued.
The court’s safety and comfort in interpreting and conforming to the
letter of the Act leads to a virtually ignored amenability clause and the
spirit of the voter initiative is lost in the narrow interpretation of the
statutory language.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite their statutorily compliant interpretation, California courts’
analyses remain piecemeal, as they overlook amenability. The lack of
willingness to find defendants unamenable is evident in the statistic that
over one in five defendants (23.1%) had their probation revoked in the
third year of the Act’s existence.154 With that many defendants being
guilty of at least three drug-related violations of probation or guilty of
non-drug-related violations (as those are the necessary elements to
probation being revoked) in only three years, obviously participant
amenability is a necessary element of Proposition 36. A discussion of
amenability would allow courts to enforce a level of accountability
amongst offenders and thereby focus on assisting those offenders who
want to reform but need a program that includes unattractive
consequences (such as revocation of probation or even jail time) to

153. The issue is not whether or not offenders should be allowed to relapse in their treatment
and violate their probation; more often than not that will happen because drug offenders often falter
in their road to recovery. See discussion supra Part III.B. See also discussion supra Part IV.A. The
courts’ understanding of the difficulty in overcoming drug use is evidenced by their willingness to
work with repeat offenders:
[o]ffenders with three SACPA violations were often allowed to return to treatment or
were sent to a halfway house rather than facing incarceration. In short, the courts tried to
exhaust as many options as possible before determining that an offender was not
amenable to treatment. Participants in one county reported developing a special drug
court for the small number of offenders violated out of SACPA.
UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 83.
The issue is what to do with offenders unmotivated to change or get better. SACPA recognized that
drug users might be unmotivated to even take advantage of their Proposition 36 eligibility, however
the issue of continuing motivation once an offender is already “in the system” has yet to be
addressed or evaluated. Regarding “unmotivated clients”:
Early in the SACPA implementation process, lead agency staff in one focus county
planned to meet the challenge of serving large numbers of unmotivated clients by
assessing motivation for treatment and developing pre-treatment care for unmotivated
clients. Treatment providers in this county were experimenting with treatment approaches
such as motivational interviewing.
UCLA REPORT 2002, supra note 117, at 152.
154. UCLA REPORT 2004, supra note 123, at v.
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motivate them. Given that a court recently enjoined attempts to amend
Proposition 36 to include short periods of incarceration as a motivator, it
is especially pertinent now that amenability be addressed. If reforms
cannot be made by the legislature then the public becomes dependent
upon the courts to make Proposition 36 applicable to those persons the
voters intended.
The apparent intent of Proposition 36 is broad enough that Taylor,
Dagostino and like courts are left to themselves to determine what
elements of drug rehabilitation the voters truly intended to focus on. Did
the electorate just intend to get and keep as many minor drug violators as
possible out of jail in order to save money and avoid superfluous
punishment, or did they truly mean to rehabilitate drug-offenders looking
for a second chance and willing to clean-up and become healthy,
productive members of society? Do California voters care about an
offender’s willingness to be successful (as implied by “amenability”) or
is the point to simply offer a chance to offenders and let them “falter” as
they will?
Perhaps the courts are merely keeping in line with precedent, wary
about creating new law through any interpretation of amenability. This is
an understandable stance, especially given that the number of probation
violation hearings appears widely held to be an all-encompassing
indicator of a defendant’s eligibility for Proposition 36. Nevertheless, in
the end it is unlikely that voters intended to enact legislation that offered
an alternative to jail to minor drug-offenders only to have those offenders
take a free ride through the system—stalling jail time for as long as they
are statutorily permitted before eventually being sent to jail having never
been forced to make any real effort to get better. The annual reports
evaluating Proposition 36 do indicate that Californians are saving money
and some offenders are successfully completing treatment, however by
and large the results show that a significant number of defendants are
failing to take advantage of their opportunity to be treated and stay out of
jail. What is needed is accountability.
California’s failure to achieve accountability through S.B. 1137
leaves drug-offenders in a system that merely walks them through an
inevitable process of repeated violations and hearings with no real
motivation to stay drug free; there are no consequences for repeated
violations so offenders feel no need to change their behavior.
Amenability is needed to distinguish between those drug-offenders who
simply slip periodically in their road to recovery and those who have
never been motivated to change and are merely taking advantage of a
way to avoid prison a little longer. Until courts are willing to find a
repeat drug violator unamenable to treatment, the intent of voters to
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improve the health and safety of society while keeping costs down and
jails free of minor offenders will never be realized.
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